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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. t 
MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN, aka t Category Thirteen 
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously reversed 
respondent's conviction for manufacturing a controlled substance 
and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance 
and declared two subsections of the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3) and, in part, 58-37-2(4), to be 
unconstitutional. Specifically, whether the Court erred in its 
interpretation of State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), and 
its conclusion that these provisions of the Act violate article 
VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution because the provisions 
incorporate the federal schedules of enumerated controlled 
substances, as contained in the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act, into the Utah schedules of enumerated controlled substances. 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. Green, No. 890222-CA (Utah Ct. App. May 23, 
1990) (included as Appendix A). 
-1-
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals based upon its reversal of defendant's 
convictions for manufacturing a controlled substance and 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (Supp. 
1988), respectively, and its declaration of two subsections of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3) 
and, in part, 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988), unconstitutional. The 
opinion was filed on May 23, 1990. No petition for rehearing was 
filed. On June 19, 1990, this Court granted an extension of time 
in which to file this petition to July 8, 1990. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
2-2(3)(a) and (5) (Supp. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 1 (in relevant part): 
The Legislative power of the State shall be 
vested: 
(1) In a Senate and House of 
Representatives which shall be designated the 
Legislature of the State of Utah. 
(2) In the people of the State of Utah, as 
hereinafter stated . . . . 
Utah Const, art. V, § 1: 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, 
and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(3) (Supp. 1988): 
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, 
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled 
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V or 
the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title 
II, P.O. 91-513), as such schedules may be 
revised by Congressional enactment or by 
administrative rule of the United States 
Attorney General adopted pursuant to § 201 of 
that act, that subsequent designation, 
rescheduling or deletion shall govern. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988): 
(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor included in 
schedules I, II, III, IV or V of Section 58-
37-4, and also includes a drug, substance, or 
immediate precursor included in schedules I, 
II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, as 
those schedules may be revised to add, 
delete, or transfer substances from one 
schedule to another, whether by Congressional 
enactment or by administrative rule of the 
United States Attorney General adopted under 
Section 201 of that act. Controlled 
substance does not include distilled spirits, 
wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are 
defined or used in Title 32A, regarding 
tobacco or food. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Michael Lewis Green, was charged with two 
second degree felonies, manufacturing a controlled substance and 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (Supp. 
1988), respectively. Respondent was convicted in the First 
District Court, Box Elder County, the Honorable Gordon J. Low, 
presiding. 
On May 23, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
convictions and held that two subsections of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3) and 58-37-2(4) are 
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unconstitutional and interpreted the provisions to be incon-
sistent with article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
Because the Court of Appeals viewed this issue as dispositive, it 
did not reach the remaining issues presented by respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was convicted of manufacturing a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance following a 
jury trial on February 27 to March 2, 1989. A man who was 
working for defendant at his home observed what appeared to be a 
drug manufacturing laboratory in defendant's garage (T. 343, 
346). He later reported his observations to a deputy sheriff (T. 
349). After a period of surveillance of the premises, officers 
executed a search warrant and found a large quantity of drugs and 
chemicals in the garage (T. 51, 55). 
Chuck Hall, a chemist for the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, testified that in his opinion the laboratory in 
defendant's garage was set up for production of phenyl-2-propanone 
(T. 106-07). Under Mr. Hall's direction samples were taken of 
thirteen chemicals. These chemicals were tested by Art Terkelson 
at the Weber State Crime Lab. 
The samples were found to contain phenyl-2-propanone 
(T. 232-235) which is a precursor to the production of 
methamphetamine, and phenylacetic acid which is a precursor to the 
production of phenyl-2-propanone (113, 118). Officers found 
fifteen 50-gallon drums of phenylacetic acid on defendant's 
premises. They also found chemical formulas for the production of 
phenyl-2-propanone using phenylacetic acid (T. Ill), and formulas 
for the production of phenylacetic acid (T. 112). 
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Following respondent's conviction, he appealed to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. He argued that the affidavit in support of 
the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, 
that the informant was acting as an agent for the state and should 
be bound by the exclusionary rule, that defendant was denied due 
process because only samples of the chemicals were retained as 
evidence and the remaining amount was destroyed because it 
constituted hazardous waste, that the incorporation of the 
controlled substances contained in the federal schedules into the 
Utah schedules violated the separation of powers doctrine, and 
that the trial court erred in failing to give a requested jury 
instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed on the argument that 
the incorporation of the federal schedules was unconstitutional 
and, therefore, it did not reach the remaining issues. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REVERSED 
RESPONDENT'S CONVICTION AND ERRONEOUSLY 
DECLARED UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-3(3) & 58-
37-2(4) UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THESE SUBSECTIONS 
OF THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT ARE NOT 
INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH CONST. ART. VI, § 1. 
In State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) (included 
as Appendix B), this Court held that a provision of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act that allowed the Utah Attorney General 
to add or delete substances from the controlled substances 
schedules was an unconstitutional delegation of power in 
violation of article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. The 
provision of the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(2), provided; 
The controlled substances are enumerated in schedules I, II, 
III, IV, or V of section 58-37-4. 
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"The attorney general of the state of Utah shall administer the 
provisions of this act and may add or delete substances or 
reschedule all substances enumerated in the schedule in section 
58-37-4 . . . ." Following the Gallion decision, the Act was 
revised and no longer contains this provision. 
This Court, in Gallionf found the former statute to be 
in contravention with the separation of powers provision of 
article V, section 1, which provides: 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive 
and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Utah Const, art. V, § 1. This Court noted that the Utah attorney 
general is a member of the executive department and, therefore, 
had an obvious potential conflict. The attorney general has the 
duty of challenging possible unconstitutional provisions of 
statutes and could be placed in the "anomalous position of 
exercising a potential challenge to a law he has, in fact, 
amended." JEd. at 686. 
After holding that the statute violated the separation 
of powers provision of article V, section 1, this Court stated 
that "[t]he other aspect of this case which merits response is 
whether the Controlled Substances Act has improperly delegated 
legislative power." I^d. at 687. Because the attorney general 
determined what substances could be controlled and also scheduled 
the substances, the procedure allowed him, in effect, to 
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determine the penalty for the crime. Id. at 689. The majority-
concluded that a determination of the elements and punishment of 
a crime are exclusive functions of the legislature. 
In arriving at its conclusion, this Court noted State 
v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913), a case in which this 
Court reversed the defendant's conviction for "the infamous crime 
against nature." Although the defendant's acts were revolting, 
"in the absence of legislative enactment making such acts 
criminal and punishable, [we cannot] denounce them as crimes. To 
do so would in effect be judicial legislation." jki. at 634. 
This Court cited article V, section 1, the separation of powers 
provision, in support of its holding that the Court could not 
judicially legislate. Relying on Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380, 
483 P.2d 425 (1971), this Court again noted that it does not have 
the power to judicially legislate. In Belt, the issue was 
whether prisoners who committed a crime before a sentencing 
statute was amended to provide a lesser penalty, but were 
sentenced after the amendment, were entitled to be resentenced 
under the more lenient provision. This Court stated: "The power 
of the legislature to repeal or amend the penalty to be imposed 
for a crime is not a matter of judicial concern," id. at 425, and 
noted that the power of the legislature to punish crime is 
"practically unlimited." Id. at 426 (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Criminal Law, SS 577-78). 
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At no point in Gallion, or the Utah cases upon which it 
2 
relied, did this Court hold that article VI, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution precludes the legislature from incorporating 
into its statutory scheme statutes enacted in another 
jurisdiction. 
A. The Court of Appeals Erred in Reaching the Issue of 
the Constitutionality of the Provisions of the Controlled 
Substances Act. 
"It is a well-established rule that legislative 
enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and 
will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no 
reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming 
to constitutional requirements." In re Criminal Investigation/ 
7th Dist. Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (citing 
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974)). See also 
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987); Murray City v. Hall, 
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). The appellate court must look to the 
"reasonable or actual legislative purpose" in evaluating 
constitutional challenges. J^ d. The burden is on the challenging 
party to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute. Rio 
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984). All 
doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality. Ellis v. 
Social Service Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 1: "The Legislative power to the State 
shall be vested: 1. In a Senate and House of Representatives 
which shall be designated the Legislature of the State of Utah. 
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter 
stated ...••• 
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Further, if a case can be disposed of on some other 
ground, an appellate court should not reach the issue of the 
constitutionality of a statute. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this Court 
should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to 
do so."). See also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982), limited on other grounds, State v. 
Eloge, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988); Goodsel v. Department of 
Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1974). 
In the present case, evidence at trial established that 
P-2-P, the substance at issue, was a precursor to methampheta-
mine (T. 118). Under the Utah Controlled Substances Act, as it 
existed in 1988 and absent any reliance on the Federal Act, P-2-P 
was controlled. Methamphetamine is a schedule II drug. Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (Supp. 1988). Under Utah law, 
a controlled substance includes a drug enumerated on the Utah 
schedules and its immediate precursors. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
2(4). Because P-2-P is an immediate precursor to meth-
amphetamine, the Court of Appeals did not need to reach the issue 
of the constitutionality of the provisions of the statutes that 
incorporate the federal schedules, §§ 58-37-3(3) and -4(2). Even 
absent the adoption of the federal schedules, respondent's 
manufacture and possession of P-2-P would have violated Utah law. 
B. Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3(3) and 58-37-2(4) Do Not 
Provide For An Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power 
in Violation of Article VI, Section I of the Utah Constitution. 
In Green, the Court of Appeals held that the provisions 
that allow adoption of the federal schedules do not violate 
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article V# section 1, the separation of powers provision, of the 
Utah Constitution. 
The purpose of this state constitutional 
provision is to prohibit concentration of 
legislative and executive powers of the state 
government in one person. . . . As Gallion 
makes clear, the delegation doctrine in Utah 
is found in our state constitution, not in 
judicial decisions. The court held that, 
although article V, section 1 does not 
prohibit delegation of legislative power per 
se, it does bar the delegation of legislative 
functions to persons in the executive 
department, in order to avert concentration 
of power. . . . This holding concerning 
article V, section 1 is not applicable in the 
present case because the 1979 changes in the 
Act conferred Utah legislative functions upon 
a person outside of state government, 
diffusing power, not concentrating it. 
State v. Green, No. 890222-CA, slip op. at 6 (Utah Ct. App. May 
23, 1990). 
The Court of Appeals then stated that the Gallion 
Court's "other holding" is dispositive in this case: Article VI, 
section 1 of the Utah Constitution precludes the Utah 
legislature's ability to delegate its powers as it has done by 
incorporating the federal controlled substance schedules into the 
Utah Act. The Court held that these provisions, Utah Code Ann §§ 
58-37-3(3) and 58-37-4(2), unconstitutionally delegate the power 
to add P-2-P and other substances to the Utah schedules and 
thereby "define its manufacture or possession as a crime and fix 
the penalty for that crime." Green, slip op. at 6. 
The United States Code provides that the United States 
Attorney General may by rule add, delete, or transfer a drug from 
the controlled substance schedules. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1982). 
The statute mandates that the rules must be made on the record 
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after a hearing has been held. Id. Changes in the rules may be 
instigated by the attorney general on his own motion, at the 
request of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or at the 
request of any interested party. Id. 
The federal act specifies standards and safeguards 
under which substances can be added or deleted to limit arbitrary 
or scientifically unsound changes in the schedules. See, e.g., 
21 U.S.C. 811(b) and (c) (1982). 
Section 812 governs the scheduling procedure and 
requires, with limited exceptions, that requisite findings be 
ma'de before a drug is placed on a particular schedule. For 
example, to be placed on schedule I, there must be findings that 
the drug has high potential for abuse, the drug has no medically 
accepted use in treatment, and that there is a lack of accepted 
safety for the use of the drug under medical supervision. 21 
U.S.C. 812(b)(1) (1982). The remaining four schedules require 
similar types of findings. Thus, the substances cannot be added 
to a particular schedule based upon administrative whim. 
Numerous challenges have been made in the federal 
courts to this delegation of authority by Congress to the 
Attorney General. The federal courts have universally held that 
the delegation meets constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., United 
States v. Emerson, 846 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Hope, 714 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Alexander, 
673 F.2d 287 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 876 (1982); 
United States v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 
439 U.S. 1051 (1978); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d 
-11-
Cir. 1977); United States v, Davis, 564 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977), 
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Iske v. United States, 396 
F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Suquet, 551 F.Supp. 
1194 (N.D. 111. 1982). 
The seminal United States Supreme Court case addressing 
the issue of legislative delegation of power is United States v. 
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). In Grimaud, the Supreme Court 
upheld a conviction for violating a forest grazing regulation 
promulgated by the secretary of agriculture. The Court noted 
that in enacting the Forest Reserve Act, Congress had stated that 
a violation of rules and regulations would be punished. Thus, 
Congress, not the secretary of agriculture, had determined that 
violations of the Act would be a crime. 
This Court attempted to distinguish Grimaud in Gallion, 
stating that under the Utah Controlled Substance Act, the Utah 
attorney general (under the former provision) not only determined 
what substances should be controlled, but also determined the 
schedule and, therefore, the applicable penalty. Gallion, 572 
P.2d at 688-89. Again, the statutory scheme has been revised and 
the Utah attorney general no longer has this authority. Still, 
however, the issue remains with respect to delegation of 
authority to penalize crimes. Other courts have examined this 
issue and determined that this delegation does not allow an 
administrator to determine that certain acts involving controlled 
substances are criminal, but rather grants the power to determine 
the chemicals that satisfy the legislative requirements for 
control. In United States v. Suquet, 551 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. 
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111. 1982), the court rejected the defendant's argument that 
Grimaud does not allow Congress to delegate power under which the 
executive determines not only which particular transactions are 
criminal, but also the penalties to be imposed. Jd. at 1197. 
The court stated: 
Grave constitutional questions would be 
present if Congress had legislated the 
following law: 
Distribution of any substance 
determined by the administrator 
to meet the requirements for 
control established herein shall 
be illegal. The penalty for 
such distribution shall be as 
the Administrator provides by 
rule. 
See Gelhorn, Administrative Prescription and 
Imposition of Penalties, 1970 Wash. U.L.Q. 
265, 268-71; see also United States v. 
Batchelder 442 U.S. 114, 125-26 . . . (1979). 
The Controlled Substances Act, however, is 
quite clearly of a different mold. Congress 
did not grant the Administrator the power to 
determine which penalties should be imposed 
upon which sorts of generic violations (e.g., 
possession with intent to distribute a 
Schedule II substance). Congress itself made 
these determinations. The Administrator was 
authorized to do nothing more than determine 
which substances belong within which 
Schedule. This is entirely permissible under 
Grimaud. 
Id. at 1197-98. 
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that 
because different schedules carry differing penalties, the 
administrator has too much control over the punishment to be 
imposed. The court stated that the argument failed for two 
reasons. First, the detailed criteria in sections 812(b)(l)-(5) 
govern on which schedule a substance will be placed. Id. at 
-13-
1198. Second, there is always some discretion in a Grimaud 
situation. In Grimaud, the secretary could implicitly determine 
the penalty by determining whether or not to make grazing without 
a permit a crime; thus, he had at least two choices. Under the 
Controlled Substances Act, the secretary is, under some 
circumstances, given a few more options, but they are subject to 
rigid standards. "If the Forest Reserve Act passed muster [in 
Grimaud1, so must the Controlled Substances Act." Ld. at 1198. 
Legislative delegation of power to executive and 
administrative agencies is essential to the operation of 
government. See Williams, Police Rulemaking Revised: Some New 
Thoughts On An Old Problem, Vol. 47: No. 4 Law & Comtemp. Prob. 
148 (1984). Most other courts have held that the legislature may 
delegate its powers regarding criminal measures, so long as there 
are adequate standards and safeguards to assure that the 
administrator cannot abuse the discretion the legislature has 
conferred. See, e.g., People v. Lowrie, 761 P.2d 778 (Colo. 
1988) (legislature's delegation of authority to administrative 
agency regarding control of alcoholic beverages was not an 
unlawful delegation of power to define criminal conduct); Clark 
County Sheriff v. Lugman, 101 Nev. 149, 697 P.2d 107 (1985) 
(Controlled Substances Act did not unconstitutionally delegate 
power to board of pharmacy to define criminal conduct); State v. 
Peloquin 427 A.2d 1327 (R.I. 1981) (the Controlled Substances Act 
did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to the 
state director of health because the Act required the director to 
adopt the federal schedules or to justify the exclusion); Montoya 
-14-
v, O'Toole, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 (1980) (allowing the state 
board of pharmacy to schedule drugs was not an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority where the authority was subject to 
legislative standards); State v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 92 Wash. 
2d 894, 602 P.2d 1172 (1979) (the proscribed criminal conduct was 
defined by the legislature; therefore, it was not improper to 
delegate power to an administrator to adopt regulations); State 
v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514 (1977) (designation of 
substances as controlled based upon other state laws, the federal 
law, or a regulation by the state board of pharmacy was not an 
unconstitutional delegation of authority); People v. Uriel, 57 
Mich. App. 419, 225 N.W.2d 788 (1977) (Controlled Substances Act 
did not unconstitutionally delegate power to the board of 
pharmacy because there were adequate guidelines for scheduling 
drugs). 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah respectfully submits that the Court 
of Appeals has decided an important question of state law that 
should be settled by this Court. Based upon Rule 46(d), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the foregoing arguments and 
authorities, the State requests that this Court grant its 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to 
-15-
review the Court's reversal of defendant's conviction and its 
declaration as unconstitutional two subsections of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act. 
DATED this day of July, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
BEARNSC 
tant Attorney General 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant Michael Lewis Green appeals his convictions of 
two second-degree felonies, manufacturing a controlled 
substance and possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance, in violation of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, 
Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (i v) (Supp. 1 988) 
respectively, We reverse, 
The controlled substance involved :i : both counts was 
phenyl-2-propanone (P2P). Defendant asserts that certain 
provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act improperly 
delegated legislative power by permitting the United States 
Attorney General prospectively to add P2P as a controlled 
substance under the Utah criminal statute. Because it 
delegates the definition of the elements of, and the penalty 
for, a Utah crime, defendant argues, the statute violates 
article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which vests 
legislative power in the Utah Legislature. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act, enacted in 1971 Utah 
Laws, ch. 145 (effective January 1, 1972), established five 
schedules of specified drugs, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (1974), 
and defined a "controlled substanceH in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2(5) (1974) as a drug, substance, or immediate 
precursor in those schedules. The legislature gave the Utah 
Attorney General prospective authority to designate a substance 
as an Mimmediate precursor," Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(23) 
(1974), and to reschedule substances, add substances to, or 
delete substances from the Utah schedules by following the 
procedures set forth in section 58-37-5. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 58-37-3(2) to -3(7) (1974). 
The Act was substantially amended in 1979 Utah Laws, ch. 12 
(effective May 8, 1979). The definition of Hcontrolled 
substance" was expanded beyond those drugs enumerated in the 
Utah schedules, to include a 
drug, substance, or immediate precursor 
included in schedules I, II, III, IV or V 
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as those 
schedules may be revised to add, delete, 
or transfer substances from one schedule 
to another, whether by Congressional 
enactment or by administrative rule of the 
United States Attorney General adopted 
pursuant to § 201 of that act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988).1 Through 1979 Utah 
Laws ch. 12, § 2, the delegation of prospective authority to 
the Utah Attorney General in section 58-37-3(2) through -3(7) 
was stricken. In its place, the declaration of what substances 
were McontrolledM was amended to add the following to those 
substances actually listed in the section 58-37-4 schedules: 
(2) All controlled substances listed in 
the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended 
from time to time, are hereby controlled. 
1. The actual amendatory language varied slightly in form, but 
not in content, from that in effect when Green was arrested and 
charged. See 1979 Utah Laws, ch. 12, § 1. Although the 
subsection has undergone additional stylistic changes since 
1988, the definition of controlled substances in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2(4) (1990) remains essentially the same. 
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, 
rescheduled or deleted as a controlled 
substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V 
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules 
may be revised by Congressional enactment 
or by administrative rule of the United 
States Attorney General adopted pursuant 
to § 201 of that act [21 U.S.C.A. § 811], 
that subsequent designation, rescheduling 
or deletion, shall govern, 
Utah Code Anx i § 58-37 3 (1986). 
When defendant was arrested and charged in September 1988, 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1988),2 set forth four 
categories of prohibited acts involving controlled substances. 
The punishment for the proscribed conduct varied, as it does 
under the current version of the Act, depending on the schedule 
in section 58-37-4 in which the particular controlled substance 
was listed. A violation of section 58-37-8(1)(a) was 
punishable as a second-degree felony if it involved a substance 
from schedule I or II; as a third-degree felony if the 
substance was classified in Schedule III or IV; and as a class 
A misdemeanor if the substance was classified in Schedule V. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (Supp. 1988) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a) (Supp. 1988) provided: 
(a) Except as authorized r>i 
chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, ui aisy 
to possess with intent to produce 
manufacture, or dispense, -» -o^ t-^  .;;* 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in 
the course of his business as a sales 
representative of a manufacturer or 
distributor of substances listed in 
Schedules II through V except under 
order or prescription; 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit 
substance with i ntent to di stribute. 
In this case, Green was charged with possession and 
manufacture of P2P as a controlled substance. P2P was not 
listed as a controlled substance in the Utah schedules in 
section 58-37-4.3 Nor was P2P listed as a controlled 
substance in the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. 
§ 812 (1981), on the January 1, 1972, effective date of the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act, or on the May 8, 1979, 
effective date of the amendment of sections 58-37-2(5) and 
-3(3) of the Utah Act. Furthermore, P2P had not been added to 
the federal schedules by administrative action on those dates. 
However, the State asserts that P2P was administratively 
-added" to Utah's Schedule II after May 8, 1979, by the United 
States Attorney General, pursuant to the delegated authority in 
the 1979 amendment of sections 58-37-2(5) and -3(3). By 
administrative action effective February 11, 1980, the United 
States Attorney General placed phenylacetone (also known as 
phenyl-2-propanone, P2P, benzyl methyl ketone, or methyl benzyl 
ketone) on federal Schedule II as an immediate precursor to 
methamphetamine and amphetamine.4 21 C.F.R. § 1308.21 
3. The Utah Controlled Substances Precursor Act, which took 
effect April 1, 1989, lists phenylacetic acid and 
phenylpropanolamine and their salts as precursor chemicals. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-2(5) (1990). 
4. The 1979 amendment to the Utah Controlled Substances Act 
incorporated the Federal Controlled Substances Act, which was 
first enacted by Congress on October 27, 1970. 21 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 801 to 904 (1981). Section 811(e) allows the United States 
Attorney General to add "immediate precursors," defined in 21 
U.S.C.A. § 802(34)(A) (Supp. 1990), to the federal schedules of 
controlled substances without going through the normal 
administrative rulemaking process otherwise necessary for 
scheduling a drug or substance. This summary procedure was 
used by the United States Attorney General to amend 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1308.12, effective February 11, 1980, by adding the following 
subsection to federal Schedule II: 
(f) Immediate precursors. Unless 
specifically excepted or unless listed in 
another schedule, any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation which contains any 
quantity of the following substances: 
(1) Immediate precursor to amphetamine 
and methamphetamine: 
(i) Phenylacetone-8501 
(1981); 4 i Fed. Reg. iiu,/' (1979). Cieeii responds that, 
because the delegation of legislative power to the federal 
officer in the 1979 amendment to the Utah Act violates the Utah 
Constitution, federal administrative action after May 8, 1979, 
adding P2P to the federal schedule could not validly add P2P fi 
the Utah schedule of controlled substances,5 
Before Utah's amendment of the Act in 1 979/ as discussed 
above, the Utah Legislature had vested authority in the Utah 
Attorney General to add substances to the Utah schedules by 
future administrative action, That delegation of legislative 
power was challenged in State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1977), and held unconstitutional, perhaps prompting the 1979 
legislative changes to the Act, which simply substituted a 
delegation of the same prospective lawmaking authoritv t i 
I Tnited States Attorney General 
The first question in Gallion was whether the 1979 
enactment had violated the separation of powers provision in 
Utah Constitution article V, section 1, by granting power to 
the Utah Attorney General to, in effect, amend the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act by adding, deleting, or rescheduling 
a controlled substance. That section of the state constitution 
provides: 
The powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
(Footnote 4 continued) 
Some trade or other names: phenyl-2-propano ; 
benzyl methyl ketone; methyl benzyl ketone. 
(2) Immediate precursors to phencyclidine (PCP): 
(i) l-phenylcyclohexylamine-7460 
(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC)-8603 
5. Green's appeal does not involve a substance that, on 
May 8, 1979, effective date of the amendment of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, was a federally scheduled controlled 
substance as the result of either federal administrative or 
congressional action. We, therefore, do not address the issue 
of the extent to which the Utah Legislature may, consistent 
with the state constitution, adopt another jurisdiction's laws 
and administrative rules defining the elements of a crime and 
the penalty therefor. 
charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these 
departments/ shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
The purpose of this state constitutional provision is to 
prohibit concentration of legislative and executive powers of 
the state government in one person. See Gallion, 572 P.2d at 
686. Because there is no provision in the federal constitution 
comparable to article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, 
the court pointed out# federal case law concerning the 
delegation of legislative power is not helpful in interpreting 
the Utah constitutional provision. I£. As Gallion makes 
clear, the delegation doctrine in Utah is found in our state 
constitution, not in judicial decisions. The court held that, 
although article V, section 1 does not prohibit delegation of 
legislative power per se, it does bar the delegation of 
legislative functions to persons in the executive department, 
in order to avert concentration of power. !£. at 687. This 
holding concerning article V, section 1 is not applicable in 
the present case because the 1979 changes in the Act conferred 
Utah legislative functions upon a person outside of state 
government, diffusing power, not concentrating it. 
However, we agree with Green that the Gallion court's other 
holding, which pertains to the limits in Utah Constitution 
article VI, section 1 on the Utah Legislature's ability to 
delegate its legislative powers, is dispositive in his case. 
Because Utah Constitution article VI, section 1 vests 
legislative power in the Utah Legislature, Green contends that 
the Utah Legislature could not constitutionally delegate to any 
person or agency the power to add P2P or anything else to those 
scheduled substances that are controlled under Utah law, and 
thereby define its manufacture or possession as a crime and fix 
the penalty for that crime. 
In Gallion, a necessary element of the crime was that the 
proscribed conduct involve a controlled substance. There, the 
crime charged was the making of a false or forged prescription 
for a controlled substance. Here, a necessary element of the 
crime is that the proscribed conduct involve a controlled 
substance. Here, the crimes charged are the manufacture and 
possession of a controlled substance. In Gallion, the 
controlled substance, Demerol, was placed on Utah Schedule II 
by the Utah Attorney General through the mandated rulemaking 
process, so that any proscribed conduct involving it 
constituted a third-degree felony. Here, once the United 
States Attorney General administratively added P2P as a 
controlled substance on Utah schedule II, any proscribed 
conduct involving P2P purportedly constituted a second-degree 
felony, 
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Gallion, 572 P.2d at 
687, that article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which 
vests legislative power in the Utah Legislature, limits the 
legislature's ability to delegate that power to others. 
Reiterating that there are certain "essential legislative 
functions- that cannot be delegated, M * at 688,5 the Gallion 
court held that the "determination of the elements of a crime 
and the appropriate punishment therefor are, under our [Utah] 
Constitutional system, judgments, which must be made 
exclusively by the legislature.- J&. at 690; see also State v. 
Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913) (it Is for the 
legislature, not the courts, to defi ne what, constitutes 
criminal conduct).7 
The Utah Supreme Court identified sound
 reasons for its 
ruling that the definition of a crime and the punishment for 
are essential legislative functions that cannot be delegated 
ai"! administrative agency: 8 {] ) criminal trials wot il d be 
6. See also Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 
734, 740-41 (1936) (power to determine amount of tax penalty is 
nondelegable legislative function); Western Leather and Finding 
Co, v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526, 528 (1935) 
(imposition of a tax and designation of who must pay it are 
essential legislative functions, which legislature cannot 
delegate to state agency). 
/. Ais the court noted, in Gallion, 572 P.2d at 688, the state 
constitutional requirement that the essential legislative 
function of specifying and punishing conduct as criminal be 
performed by the legislature itself, not by administrative 
agency action, is incorporated into Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-105 
(1978), which states: "Common law crimes are abolished and no 
conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other 
applicable statute or ordinance.11 
8. Although the Utah Liui>feme Supreme Court has recognized that 
there is "a certain peril involved i £ administrative procedures 
can be applied to the criminal law,fi Gallion. 572 P.2d at 690, 
courts in other states have not been as perceptive. 
unduly complicated because a defendant could challenge the 
administrative procedures and findings underlying the 
scheduling of a substance; and (2) because administrative 
rulings are not codified, citizens would have to resort to 
records outside the Utah Code to determine the status of a 
particular substance.9 Gallion. 572 P.2d at 689-90. 
Gallion squarely held that crime definition and penalty 
powers are essential legislative functions that cannot 
constitutionally be delegated by the Utah Legislature to any 
other person or body. Nonetheless, the legislatures 
subsequent amendment of the Act in 1979 ignored the limits on 
delegation of its powers in Utah Constitution article VI, 
section 1, articulated by the Gallion court. Because we are 
(Footnote 8 continued) 
Intentionally or not, they have permitted administrative law 
principles, state and federal, to creep into their decisions 
and dictate their criminal law. For example, see State v. 
Kellogg. 98 Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514, 516-18 (1977), in which 
the court cited state and federal administrative law decisions 
and Professor Davis's treatise in a criminal case like Gallion 
involving the sale of a prescription drug. In Kellogg, 
scheduling of prescription drugs as controlled substances was 
statutorily delegated to the Idaho Board of Pharmacy. This 
delegation was upheld because the statute (1) contained a 
declaration of policy; (2) selected the agency to effectuate 
the policy; and (3) defined the limits of the Board's power. 
The court in Montova v. 0*Tooele. 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 
(1980), involving possession of Valium, also used 
administrative law concepts. There, the legislature had 
delegated to the State Board of Pharmacy the power to schedule 
drugs and controlled substances under New Mexico criminal law. 
The delegation was upheld because the delegation was 
accompanied with strict guidelines, clear standards, and 
definite duties. The court, using administrative law 
principles, found this scheme to allow the Board only minimal 
discretion in the fact-finding function and to give the Board 
no discretion in enacting substantive law. 
9. The State makes a public policy argument in support of the 
Utah Legislature's delegation of lawmaking authority to the 
United States Attorney General, namely, the "enormous burden" 
placed on the legislature to monitor thousands of new drugs 
developed each year. See Kellogg, 568 P.2d at 517; Montoya, 
610 P.2d at 192. There is, however, nothing in this record to 
support these claims. 
unable to distinguish Gallion on this controlling point, we 
conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3(3) (1986) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988), violate article VI, section 1 
of the Utah Constitution insofar as they allow the United 
States Attorney General to add substances to the Utah schedules 
of controlled substances after May 8, 1979. Accordingly, P2P 
was not a substance controlled by the statute under which Green 
was charged# and we are compelled to reverse Green's 
convictions on this ground. 
In light of this conclusion, we need not address Green's 
remaining arguments. However, we need to delineate the scope 
of our constitutional ruling. 
Defendant has not challenged the entire Utah Controlled 
Substances Act as unconstitutional, ge_e note 5, supra. He has 
attacked only the provisions added by the 1979 amendments to 
the Act, effective May 8, 1979, in which the United States 
Attorney General was granted prospective legislative power to 
amend the Utah statute by adding, deleting, or transferring 
substances on,, the federal schedules. 
The applicable rule of statutory construct m i MI h 
ci tcumstances is that, 
statutes, where possible, are to be 
construed so as to sustain their 
constitutionality. Accordingly, i£ a 
portion of the statute might be saved by 
severing the part that is unconstitutional, 
such should be done. 
Celebrity club j n C m v. utah Licruor Control Comm'n, bb J P. 2d 
1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). This basic rule applies to the 
construction of criminal statutes. State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 
2d 66, 426 P.2d 13, 15 (1967). Where part of a statute is 
unconstitutional, severability is primarily a matter of 
legislative intent, Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of 
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977), which a court 
ascertains by determining whether the remaining portions of the 
enactment can stand alone and serve a legitimate purpose. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P„ 2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985) . 
The provisions challenged by Green were apparently added to 
the Act separately as a response, albeit an inadequate one, to 
the decision in Gallion. We believe the legislature intended 
that the remaining provisions be enforced independent of the 
1979 amendments for the legitimate purpose of punishing conduct 
involving those substances expressly included in the schedules 
in section 58-37-4. The remaining provisions were enforced in 
this same manner during the period between the Gallion decision 
on November 17, 1977, and the effective date of the 1979 
amendment of the Act. We conclude that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-3(3) (1986) and the portion of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) delegating legislative power to the 
United States Attorney General are severable from the remaining 
portions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
The convictions are reversed. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge 
BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
I agree that the Controlled Substances Act passes 
constitutional muster under article V# section 1# of the Utah 
Constitution. I disagree, however, with the majority's 
conclusion that the Act violates article VI# section 1. 
When we are faced with a challenge to the constitutionality 
of a statute/ we must adhere to the rule that "legislative 
enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity 
and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no 
basis upon which they can be construed as conforming to 
constitutional requirements.* In re Criminal Investigation, 
754 P.2d 633/ 640 (Utah 1988) (citing Greaves v. State, 528 
P.2d 805/ 806-07 (Utah 1974)). 
The main opinion reverses defendant's convictions on the 
authority of State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977). The 
narrow holding of Gallion is that the former Act was an 
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine 
of article V since it allowed the executive in charge of 
enforcing the law to exercise legislative functions. The 
opinion could have, and for clarity's sake, arguably should 
have, stopped there. Instead, it went on to talk about 
improper legislative delegation. 
My colleagues suggest that this dicta was framed under 
article VI. I disagree. The legislative delegation discussion 
in Gallion was framed under statute and case law.1 The 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1974), provided as 
follows: "Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a 
crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or 
ordinance.- The case, State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 
(1913), held that under article V (not VI), courts may not 
denounce and punish as crimes acts and omissions not made 
punishable by statute. 
By the Controlled Substances Act, the legislature has 
criminalized the manufacture, distribution, and possession of 
controlled substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a) 
(1990). The legislature has given a federal agency the task of 
identifying the particular substances to be controlled. Such 
delegation of responsibility is not, on its face, an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See 
Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: Some New Thoughts on an 
Old Problem, 47:4 Law & Contemp. Probs. 123 (Autumn 1984). 
Whether our statute is unconstitutional should turn not on 
article VI, but on whether the legislature has adequately 
identified standards and procedural safeguards for the 
placement of substances on the schedules. See generally, 
Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713 
(1969). 
From a practical viewpoint, the prohibition against 
legislative delegation cannot be absolute. As explained by 
Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion in Gallion: 
[D]ue to the complexities of human 
society, which are ever increasing, the 
function of the legislative branch must 
necessarily be that of a general policy 
1. In Gallion, "the Utah Supreme Court affirmed on grounds that 
the Constitution of Utah prohibits the legislature from 
delegating both legislative and executive powers to a single 
person, and further, that the power to define conduct as 
criminal is exclusively reserved to the legislature by both 
statute and case law." 1978 Utah L. Rev. 399 (footnotes 
omitted). 
making body and that it cannot spell out 
all of the details of the administration 
and application of law. Consequently# it 
is necessary that the executive branch 
(e.g., administrative agencies . . . ), in 
order to carry out the responsibilities 
imposed upon them, have the power to make 
rules and regulations that must be 
complied with, and that failure to comply 
must have sanctions or penalties, and that 
they therefore must have the force of law. 
572 P.2d at 690. 
In addition to the Controlled Substances Act, other 
legislation has defined the general crime and then left to an 
administrative agency the responsibility of specifying the 
prohibited activity. As long as the rules and regulations 
promulgated under such legislation meet due process 
requirements, they should be enforceable. 
I cannot reverse this case solely on the authority of 
Gallion. 
&»*ct & m**^ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
APPENDIX B 
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Cite as 572 P.2d 683 
Utah 683 
of trial judge unless his judgment is clearly 
arbitrary or capricious and not based on the 
evidence. 
Lyle J. Barnes, Kaysville, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Robert B Hansen, Atty. Gen., Franklyn 
B. Matheson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, Ernest W. Jones, Asst. Weber County 
Atty., Ogden, for defendant and respon-
dent. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: 
This case was before us in 1976 wherein 
Mrs. Wilson appealed from a ruling of the 
trial court to the effect that she, as a 
grandmother, had no standing to interfere 
with the Family Services Division in its 
placement of her grandson for adoption.1 
This Court reversed and held that the blood 
relationship between grandparent and 
grandchild is such that the court should 
have continued a stay of proceedings order 
until the grandmother could have her day 
in court. 
That day as now been had. Mrs. Wilson's 
counsel called the members of the defend-
ant's committee on the placement of chil-
dren and tried to show that they acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in placing the 
child in an adoptive home. He also tried to 
show that the committee never considered 
his client as a possible person to adopt the 
child Mrs. Wilson also gave testimony as 
to her ability to rear the child, etc. 
The trial court heard the testimony and 
held that in considering the placement of 
the child for adoption, the defendant (re-
spondent) did not act capriciously or arbi-
trarily in any manner. All the committee 
witnesses testified that they had seriously 
considered the grandmother as one to w horn 
adoption could be permitted, but that the 
welfare of the child was the paramount 
item in making the determination that they 
made. 
[1,2] At the hearing from which this 
appeal was taken, the witnesses were still 
of the opinion that the child should be left 
in the home in which he has resided for 
several years past. The trial court was 
justified in ruling as it did, and we should 
not substitute our judgment for that of the 
trial judge unless his judgment is clearly 
arbitrary or capricious and not based on the 
evidence. 
In this case, the judge learned that Mrs. 
Wilson had been married three times; that 
she refused to speak to the mother of the 
child; that the mother voluntarily surren-
dered the child to the defendant for the 
purpose of adoption and specifically re-
quested that the defendant not place the 
child with the grandmother. The court act-
ed properly in making its ruling. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. No costs are awarded. 
CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the result 
( O ^ KEYNUMBERSYSTEM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Debra Kay GALLION, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 14966. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 17, 1977. 
State appealed from order of the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. Rob-
ert Bullock, J., which quashed information 
which charged defendant with making a 
false or forged prescription for controlled 
substance. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
J., held that: (1) provision of the Controlled 
1. Wilson v Family Semces, Utah, 554 P 2d 227 (1976) 
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Substances Act authorizing the Attorney 
General to add or delete substances from 
the list of controlled substances was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power to an individual charged with exer-
cising functions of the executive depart-
ment, and (2) provision of the Controlled 
Substances Act violated provision of the 
criminal code abolishing common-law 
crimes and providing that no conduct is a 
crime unless made so by the criminal code 
or by other applicable statute or ordinance. 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, J., concurred separately and 
filed an opinion. 
Ellett, C. J., dissented and filed an 
opinion. 
1. Drugs and Narcotics <§=>71 
Necessary element of the crime of 
making a false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance is 
that the proscribed conduct involve a con-
trolled substance. U.C.A.1953, 58-37-
8(4)(a). 
2. Constitutional Law e=»50 
Constitutional provision that the pow-
ers of government shall be divided into 
three distinct departments and that no per-
son charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of those depart-
ments shall exercise any functions apper-
taining-to either of the others except in 
cases expressly directed or permitted is in-
tended to prohibit the concentration of leg-
islative and executive powers in one person. 
Const, art. 5, § 1. 
3. Constitutional Law e=»62(l) 
Since inhibitions of constitutional pro-
hibition against any person charged with 
exercise of the powers of one department of 
government exercising any functions apper-
taining to either of the other two depart-
ments of government are directed toward 
specific persons, there is nothing to restrain 
legislative department from creating ad-
ministrative bodies to exercise legislative 
functions. Const, art. 5, § 1. 
4. Constitutional Law <§=»60 
Intent expressed by constitutional pro-
hibition against any person who is charged 
with the exercise of powers properly be-
longing to one of the three distinct depart-
ments of government from exercising any 
functions appertaining to either of the oth-
er two is not to proscribe delegation of 
legislative power but rather to prevent 
those who exercise power assigned by the 
constitution to their department from ag-
grandizement of their power, however de-
rived, by exercising functions appertaining 
to another department. Const, art. 5, § 1. 
5. Constitutional Law <e=>62(l) 
Constitutional prohibition against any 
person who is charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of the 
three distinct departments of government 
from exercising any functions appertaining 
to either of the other two is not directed 
towards the delegation of legislative power 
per se but proscribes the conferring of leg-
islative functions on specified persons in the 
executive department to avert any poten-
tial for>tyranny by concentrating power in 
those individuals. Const art. 5, § 1. 
6. Constitutional Law <s=>62(5) 
Drugs and Narcotics <&=»43 
Provision of a Controlled Substances 
Act that the Attorney General shall admin-
ister the act and may add or delete sub-
stances or reschedule all substances enu-
merated in the act is an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power to an indi-
vidual charged with exercising powers of 
the executive department. Const, art. 5, 
§ 1; U.C.A.1953, 58-37-3(2). 
7. Drugs and Narcotics <s=>43 
Provision of the Controlled Substances 
Act allowing the Attorney General to add 
or delete substances from the lists of con-
trolled substances conflicts with provision 
of the criminal code abolishing common-law 
crimes and providing that no conduct is a 
crime unless made so by the criminal code 
or by other applicable statute or ordinance. 
U.C.A.1953, 58-37-3(2), 76-1-105. 
STATE v. GALLION 
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Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., William W. 
Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
Noall T. Wootton, Utah County Atty., 
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for defendant 
and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
The state appeals from an order of the 
district court quashing an information filed 
against defendant. Defendant was charged 
with a violation of Section 58-37-8(4) D 
(a)(iii), U.C.A.1953, as enacted in 1972, that 
she altered a forged prescription for a 
Schedule II controlled substance, demerol. 
Conviction under this section provides the 
penalty for a felony in the third degree. 
We affirm. 
In Section 58-37-4(3Xb), the substances 
which were determined by the legislature to 
be included in Schedule II were set forth. 
The substance, demerol, does not appear 
therein. The state asserted in a memoran-
dum to the trial court that the attorney 
general had added demerol to Schedule II 
in accordance with the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, Title 58, Chapter 37. Spe-
cifically the state claimed: 
. . . Since the adoption of the 
Controlled Substance Act, Demerol has 
been added to the controlled substance 
list, a true list being in the possession of 
Dr. Wesley Parish, a chemist, located at 
815 West Columbia Lane, Provo, Utah1 
[1] The trial court granted the motion 
to quash on the ground provisions in the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act under 
which the attorney general added demerol 
as a controlled substance were an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power 
Section 58-37-8(4) D (a), under which de-
fendant was charged, provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly and intentionally: 
1. Although the defendant specificalh asserted 
the issue that demerol v>as not proscribed in 
Schedule II, the state did not proffer am evi-
dence to show compliance with Sec 58-37-
5(3) "every substance controlled b> 
(lii) To make any false or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled 
substance, or to alter the same or to alter 
any prescription or written order issued 
or written pursuant to the terms of this 
act. 
Thus a necessary element of the crime 
charged is that the proscribed conduct in-
volves a controlled substance. Section 58-
37-2(5) provides: 
The words 'controlled substance' mean 
a drug, substance, or immediate precursor 
in schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of section 
58-37-4. . . . 
Under the legislative design, one of the 
consequences of scheduling a substance is 
the determination of the penalty for the 
crime, viz., the penalties for acts proscribed 
under section 58-37-8(1) A and (5) E are 
more severe for controlled substances in 
schedules I and II than those in III, IV, and 
V. Section 58-37-3(2) provides: 
The attorney general of the state of 
U a^h shall administer the provisions of 
this act and may add or delete substances 
or reschedule all substances enumerated 
in the schedule in section 58-37-4. . 
Thus power is conferred on the attorney 
general to define a crime, viz., to proscribe 
conduct not previously deemed criminal un-
der the Controlled Substances Act, and to 
designate the penalty therefor by the sched-
uling of the substance. 
Is the grant of power to the attorney 
general to amend, in effect, the act by 
adding, deleting or rescheduling a con-
trolled substance unconstitutional? Article 
V, Section I, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
The powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislate e, the 
Executne, and the Judicial, and no per-
son charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these de-
the attome> general to have effect shall be 
certified and filed with the office of the secre-
tary of state The secretary of state shall keep 
a permanent register of the rules or controls 
certified " 
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partments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, ex-
cept in the cases herein expressly directed 
or permitted. 
The attorney general is a member of the 
Executive Department, Article VII, Section 
1. He is the legal advisor of the State 
officers, Article VII, Section 18. In Hansen 
v. Barlow2 this court ruled it is within the 
right of the attorney general, if not his 
duty, to bring suits to clarify the constitu-
tionality of laws enacted by the Legislature 
if he deems it appropriate. Under the Con-
trolled Substances Act, a person charged 
with the exercise of executive powers, 
which in the case of the attorney general, 
includes the duty to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a law, is assigned a function3 
appertaining to the legislative department. 
The conflict is obvious, the person, who is to 
be alert to possible constitutional infirmi-
ties, is participating in the legislative proc-
ess by determining an essential element of 
a crime and the penalty. By this act, the 
attorney general is consigned to the anoma-
lous position of exercising a potential chal-
lenge to a law he has, in fact, amended. 
[2] If Article V, Section 1, has any pur-
pose it is to prohibit the concentration of 
legislative and executive powers in one per-
son. The adherence to federal case law 
concerning the delegation of legislative 
power does not resolve the dilemma of in-
terpreting Article V, Section 1, for there is 
no comparable provision in the Constitution 
of the United States. 
As pointed out in 1 Davis, Administrative 
Law Treatise, Section 2.02, p. 79: 
The non-delegation doctrine is wholly 
judgemade. The Constitution provides 
merely: 'All legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States . . .' The power 
2. 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969) 
3. In State ex rel Black v Burch, 226 Ind 445, 
80 NE2d 294, 302 (1948) the court, m inter-
preting a constitutional provision similar to Ar-
ticle V, Sec 1, observed that the words "pow-
er" and "functions" were interchangeable, but 
is also granted 'to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into Execution the foregoing Powers/ 
Some congressional powers must obvious-
ly be delegated, including the powers 'to 
collect taxes/ 'to borrow mon-
ey/ 'to coin money/ and 'to raise and 
support Armies/ Delegation was not dis-
cussed at the Constitutional Convention, 
except that a motion by Madison that the 
President be given power 'to execute such 
other powers . . . as may from 
time to time be delegated by the national 
Legislature' was defeated as unnecessary. 
Davis points out as palpably unsound the 
assertion by the Supreme Court in 1911 that 
"the authority to make administrative rules 
is not a delegation of legislative power, nor 
are such rules raised from an administra-
tive to a legislative character because the 
violation thereof is punished as a public 
offense."4 Davis contends the assertion 
that authority as to what the law shall be is 
not delegable is clearly false, for virtually 
every statute creating an administrative 
agency delegates authority to determine 
what the law shall be. Davis claims that 
the recent opinions of the Supreme Court 
have generally been reasonably frank in 
recognizing that the law making power is 
delegable.5 More recently Davis has stated: 
The non-delegation doctrine is almost a 
complete failure. It has not prevented a 
delegation of legislative power. Nor has 
it accomplished its later purpose of assur-
ing that delegated power will be guided 
by meaningful standards. More impor-
tantly, it has failed to provide needed 
protection against unnecessary and un-
controlled discretionary power. The time 
has come for the courts to acknowledge 
that the non-delegation doctrine is unsat-
isfactory and to invent better ways to 
if there be any distinction the term "functions" 
would denote a broader field of activities than 
the word "power " 
4. Id p 77. 
5. Id p 78. 
protect against arbitrary administrative 
power.6 
The delegation doctrine in this jurisdic-
tion is not judge-made law but has a foun-
dation in our state constitution. However, 
the express language in Article V, Section 1 
is addressed specifically to another aspect 
of the delegation than that developed in the 
federal case law. 
[3] In this case the prohibition of sec-
tion 1, is directed to a "person" charged 
with the exercise of powers properly be-
longing to the "executive department." 
The Constitution further specifies in Article 
VII, Section 1, the persons of whom the 
Executive Department shall consist. Thus 
it is the "persons" specified in Article VII, 
Section 1, who are charged with the exer-
cise of powers belonging to the Executive 
Department, who are prohibited from exer-
cising any functions appertaining to the 
legislative and judicial departments. Since 
, the inhibitions of the Article V, Section 1, 
are directed toward specific "persons," 
there is nothing to restrain the legislative 
department from creating administrative 
bodies to exercise legislative functions, viz., 
'rule making. Although administrative bod-
ies are nominally designated a part of the 
executive branch, they do not fall within 
the Constitutional definition of the Execu-
te e Department and the prohibition of Ar-
ticle V, Section 1 does not apply thereto. 
[4] The intent expressed in Article V, 
Section 1, was not to proscribe the delegation 
of legislative power, although under Article 
VI, Section 1, there are limitations in this 
regard, but to prevent those, who exercise 
the power assigned by the Constitution to 
their department, from aggrandizement of 
their power, however derived, by exercising 
functions appertaining to another depart-
ment. 
The purpose of the provision is aptly ex-
pressed in Story, on the Constitution (5th 
Ed.), Section 523, p. 392: 
6
- Daus, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970 
Supplement, Sec 2 00, p. 40 
7. Clayton v Bennett, 5 Uah 2d 152, 298 P 2d 
531, 535 (1956), Row ell v. State Board of Agri-
culture, 98 Uah 353, 358, 99 P2d 1 (1940) 
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And the Federalist has with equal 
point and brevity remarked, that 'the ac-
cumulation of all powers, legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and 
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or 
elective, may be justly pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny/ 
[5] In essence, Article V, Section 1 is 
not directed towards the delegation of legis-
lative power per se but proscribes the con-
ferring of legislative functions on specified 
persons in the executive department to 
avert any potentiality for tyranny by con-
centrating power in these individuals. 
[6] The other aspect of this case which 
merits response is wrhether the Controlled 
Substances Act has improperly delegated 
legislative power. The State through the 
attorney general, contends the statute con-
fers no more than the traditional adminis-
trative powers. This court has reiterated 
the Legislature may: 
. . . provide for the execution 
through administrative agencies of its 
legislative policy, and may confer upon 
such administrative officers certain pow-
ers and the duty of determining the ques-
tion of the existence of certain facts upon 
which the effect or execution of its legis-
late e policy may be dependent.7 
On the other hand, this court has stated: 
The Legislature is not permitted to ab-
dicate or transfer to others the essential 
legislative function with which it is thus 
vested. . 8 
In Western Leather and Finding Compa-
ny9 this court observed that the imposition 
of a tax and the designation of those who 
must pay the same is such an essential 
legislative function as may not be transfer-
red to others. In The v. State Tax Com-
8. Western Leather and Finding Co v State Tax 
Commission, 87 ttah 227, 231, 48 P 2d 526, 528 
(1935) 
9. Note 8, supra 
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mission10 this court ruled that giving to the 
Tax Commission the power to determine in 
its own judgment the amount of the penal-
ty was a legislative function which could 
not be delegated. In State v. Johnson11 
this court held that under the Constitution, 
the courts may not denounce and punish as 
crimes acts and omissions not made punish-
able by statute, for it is a legislative power 
to declare acts as crimes and to prescribe 
proper penalties. 
[7] The constitutional standard set forth 
in State v. Johnson is incorporated in the 
Utah Criminal Code. Section 76-1-105, as 
enacted in 1973, amended 1974, provides: 
Common law crimes are abolished and 
no conduct is a crime unless made so by 
this code, other applicable statute or ordi-
nance. 
The Controlled Substances Act, is in con-
flict with this provision, for under the act, -
conduct may be made a crime, by an admin-
istrative ruling certified by the attorney 
general and filed in the office of the secre-
tary of state, Section 58-37-5. 
Most recently, in Belt v. Turner12 this 
court stated: 
The power of the legislature to repeal 
or amend the penalty to be imposed for 
crime is not a matter of judicial concern. 
It is part of the sovereign power of the 
state, and it is the exclusive right of the 
legislature to change or amend it; . 
Thus this court has recognized there are 
certain essential legislative functions which 
cannot be transferred to others. 
This issue is reflected in 1 Davis, Admin-
istrative Law Treatise, Section 2.02, pp. 80-
81: 
Possibly the most helpful early history 
is a distinction drawn by Chief Justice 
Marshall: 'It will not be contended that 
Congress can delegate to the courts or to 
any other Tribunal, powers which are 
strictly and exclusively legislative. But 
10. 89 Utah 404, 416-417, 57 P2d 734 (1936) 
11. 44 Utah 38, 26, 137 P 632 (1913). 
Congress may certainly delegate to oth-
ers, powers which the legislature may 
rightfully exercise itself. . . . The 
line has not been exactly drawn which 
separates those important subjects, which 
must be entirely regulated by the legisla-
ture itself, from those of less interest, in 
which a general provision may be made, 
and power given to those who are to act 
under such general provisions to fill up 
the details.' If the Supreme Court had 
consistently followed this lead, the law of 
the subject might be much more satisfac-
tory. 
The state does not cite any case wherein 
conduct not previously deemed criminal has 
been so denounced and the penalty set 
through the administrative process. 
The instant case must be distinguished 
from United States v. Grimaud}* wherein 
the court ruled there was not an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power to the 
Secretary of Agriculture. The secretary 
was granted power to make rules and regu-
lations covering forest reservations. Con-
gress made it a crime to violate the rules 
and regulations made by the secretary pur-
suant to the authority granted in the stat-
ute. The secretary made a rule forbidding 
stock grazing on the forest reservation 
without a permit. The issue before the 
court was whether the forest reserve act of 
1897 was unconstitutional, insofar as it del-
egated to the Secretary of Agriculture pow-
er to make rules and regulations, and made 
a violation thereof a penal offense. The 
court stated: 
The subjects as to which the 
Secretary can regulate are defined. The 
lands are set apart as a forest reserve. 
He is required to make provision to pro-
tect them from depredations and from 
harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regu-
late the occupancy and use and to pre-
serve the forests from destruction.' A 
violation of reasonable rules regulating 
the use and occupancy of the property is 
13. 220 US 506, 31 S Ct 480, 55 LEd. 563 
(1911) 
12. 25 Utah 2d 380, 381, 483 P2d 425 (1971) 
STATE v. 
Cite as 57 
made a crime, not by the Secretary, but 
by Congress. The statute, not the Secre-
tary, fixes the penalty. 
. The Secretary did not exer-
cise the legislative power of declaring the 
penalty or fixing the punishment for 
grazing sheep without a permit, but the 
punishment is imposed by the act itself. 
14 
In the Controlled Substances Act, the ad-
ministrator not only determines that a sub-
stance should be controlled, he further 
schedules the substance, which in effect, 
declares the magnitude of the penalty and 
fixes the punishment. The administrator is 
exercising an essential legislative function 
which cannot be transferred to him. 
A challenge similar to the instant one 
was made in Howell v. State,1* wherein it 
was urged that the Mississippi Controlled 
Substances Act was unconstitutional inso-
far as it conferred on the State Board of 
Health authority to schedule or reschedule 
a controlled substance. The state argued 
the legislative grant of authority wras prop-
er since the Board was given only fact-find-
ing authority to classify dangerous sub-
stances and was provided with guidelines 
for making its determinations. The court 
observed that the question of the validity of 
the grant of authority arose because, under 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, 
the penalties prescribed for violations are 
inextricably tied to the various schedules. 
The court said: 
. The practical effect of mov-
ing a substance from one schedule and 
placing it in another is to increase or 
diminish the criminal penalty for viola-
tion of the act. It is likewise true that, if 
substances are added to or deleted from 
any of the schedules such action makes 
acts pertaining to the substances so added 
a crime, and as to substances deleted, 
abolishes a crime. The result is that the 
M. at pp. 522-523 of 220 U.S., at p. 485 of 31 
S.Ct. 
15. Miss., 300 So.2d 774 (1974). 
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State Board of Health is given the au-
thority to define a crime, and ordain its 
punishment. 
The exclusive authority of the legisla-
ture to define crimes and fix the punish-
ment therefor is without question.16 
The court cited case law from Mississippi, 
with rulings similar to those cited herein in 
Tite v. State Tax Commission, note 10 su-
pra, and State v. Johnson, note 11, supra. 
The court cited case law from other juris-
dictions wherein it has been held the power 
to define crimes and the punishment there-
for is vested in the legislature. 
The court held that the authority to 
define crimes and fix the punishment there-
for is vested exclusively in the legislature, 
and it may not delegate that power either 
expressly or by implication, but must exer-
cise it under Article 4, Section 33 of the 
Constitution of Mississippi.17 
In United States v. Pastor18 the defend-
ant argued that the federal act (Drug 
Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. Section. 811) granting 
authority to the attorney general to sched-
ule controlled substances constituted an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative au-
thority. Although the court cited United 
States v. Grimaud}9 it overlooked the quali-
fication set forth, viz., that Congress not 
the administrator had set the penalty. The 
court acknowledged the ruling in Howell v. 
Mississippi, but declined to follow it, noting 
that the anti-delegation doctrine had re-
tained much greater vitality in the state 
courts than it had in the federal courts. 
There are sound reasons for ruling the 
definition of a crime and the precise punish-
ment therefor to be essential legislative 
functions, which cannot be transferred. 
Criminal trials would be unduly complicat-
ed, for the defendant would have the right 
to challenge :he administrative procedure 
and the findings where a substance has 
been scheduled or rescheduled. A similar 
17. This provision vests the legislative power in 
the legislature. 
18. 419 F.Supp. 1316 (1976). 
16. at pp. 779-780 of 300 So.2d. 19. note 13, supra. 
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determination by the legislature could not 
be challenged. The administrative rulings 
are not statutes and are not incorporated 
into the code, a person who wishes to abide 
by the law would have to resort to the 
permanent register kept by the secretary of 
state to determine the status of a sub-
stance.20 
There is a certain peril involved if admin-
istrative procedures can be applied to the 
criminal law. Why couldn't an administra-
tor revise the penalties in Section 76-6-412, 
according to the consumer price index or a 
determination that there had been an ex-
cessive amount of theft of property valued 
at less than $100. A determination of the 
elements of a crime and the appropriate 
punishment therefor are, under our Consti-
tutional system, judgments, which must be 
made exclusively by the legislature. 
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring sepa-
rately). 
I concur in affirming the ruling of the 
district court that there is no proper foun-
dation for charging the defendant with a 
crime for possession of "demerol" as a con-
trolled substance. But I have reservations 
about some aspects of the main opinion and 
therefore state my own reasons for my 
conclusion. 
- It is to be conceded that the legislature 
cannot delegate legislative powers to execu-
tive or administrative officers or depart-
ments. However, it is also to be realized 
that due to the complexities of human soci-
ety, wrhich are ever increasing, the function 
of the legislative branch must necessarily 
be that of a general policy making body and 
that it cannot spell out all of the details of 
the administration and application of law. 
Consequently, it is necessary that the exec-
20. Here, apparently one would need to search 
out a chemist in Provo, Utah 
1. Young v Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 321, 67 P 2d 
1066(1902), Rowell v State Board of Agricul-
ture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P 2d 1 (1940) 
2. Id , 16 CJ S Constitutional Law § 138 
utive branch (eg., administrative agencies 
such as the Public Service Commission, the 
Industrial Commission and the Tax Com-
mission), in order to carry out the responsi-
bilities imposed upon them, have the power 
to make rules and regulations that must be 
complied with, and that failure to comply 
must have sanctions or penalties, and that 
they therefore must have the force of law. 
Even though the legislature cannot dele-
gate the power to make laws to an execu-
tive officer,1 it may enact laws which take 
effect upon the ascertainment of certain 
facts and conditions, and may delegate the 
duty to determine the existence of such 
facts to executive or administrative offi-
cers.2 Whether a particular delegation of 
power is valid depends upon whether the 
legislature has prescribed sufficient stan-
dards or limitations to guide the exercise of 
that power in accordance with its will.3 
It is a cardinal principle of due process 
that a person is entitled to reasonable no-
tice, or a means of knowing, what conduct 
is prohibited before he can be held criminal-
ly responsible for engaging in it.4 In con-
formity therewith the procedure for the 
adoption of such a rule, and the rule itself, 
must be of such a nature and sufficiently 
clear and definite that persons of ordinary 
intelligence who would abide by the lawT 
will knowr how to conform to its require-
ments.5 
Consistent with the foregoing, the legisla-
ture has authorized the Attorney General to 
carry out the policy of the Act under appro-
priate safeguards U.C.A 1953, sections 58-
37-3 through 7 list various factors for the 
Attorney General to consider in determin-
ing whether to control a substance. These 
include the potential of the substances for 
abuse, or a history and current pattern of 
3. Rowell v State Board of Agriculture, supra 
note 1 
4. State v Timmons, 12 Wash App 48, 527 PJ2d 
1399 (1974) 
5. Greaves v State, Utah, 528 P2d 805 (1974), 
U S v Hamss, 347 U S 612, 74 S Ct 808, 98 
LEd 989 
STATE v. 
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abuse, whether the substance is controlled 
under federal law and whether it is an 
immediate precursor of a substance already 
controlled under the Act; and the current 
state of scientific knowledge of the sub-
stance and the effects of its use. 
In regard to the requirement of notice to 
the public, Section 58-37-5(3) provides: 
every substance controlled by 
the attorney general to have effect shall 
be certified and filed with the office of 
the secretary of state. The secretary of 
state shall keep a permanent register of 
the rules or controls certified [Emphasis 
added ] 
It should be obvious to anyone reading 
those statutes, conferring such powers on 
the Attorney General, that in order to meet 
the requirements of due process of law, 
there must be compliance with the require-
ments, both as to the certification, and the 
filing in the office of the Secretary of State 
the statement as to any drug so prohibited, 
so that there is notice in that public office, 
where it can be examined by anyone who 
has an interest therein. 
As indicated in the main opinion, the 
State did not establish that the statutory 
requirements above referred to had been 
complied with; and particularly it was not 
shown that there had been the filing with 
the Secretary of State; but there wras some 
evidence indicating to the contrary. In 
view of that failure there is no foundation 
upon which to conclude that the Attorney 
General's designation of demerol as a con-
trolled substance provides a \alid basis for 
charging and prosecution for crime For 
these reasons I join in affirming the trial 
court's decision. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice (dissenting) 
The legislature listed 120 drugs as "con-
trolled substances," * i. e. substances that 
the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare or the Attorney General of the 
United States has found after investigation 
and by regulation designated as habit form-
1. U C A , as amended, 58-37-4 
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mg because of their effect on the central 
nervous system, or which has a potential 
for abuse because of their depressant or 
stimulant effect on the central nervous sys-
tem; or which has a hallucinogenic effect 
on the user. 
The legislature sought to control the use 
of all such drugs and thereby protect those 
of its citizens \* ho might use them to their 
own damage and harm. It realized that 
there might be other harmful substances 
not then known which would be equally 
dangerous to users and so a provision was 
inserted into the law2 that authorized the 
Attorney General of the State of Utah to 
add such substances to the list of proscribed 
drugs. 
The authority thus given to the attorney 
general is not, in my opinion, a delegation 
of legislative pow ers. He is strictly limited 
in his determination as to wThether the sub-
stance is injurious to the user. The sub-
stance must be of one of the classes set out 
in the statute. Notice of a hearing to de-
termine whether the new drug should be 
placed on the list is required to be given, 
and the right to be heard must be afforded 
to all interested persons. The statute3 pro-
vides that any person who is, or who may 
be, affected by a designation of any such 
listed substance has a right to a judicial 
determination of the validity of the rule or 
control by filing an action for declaratory 
relief in the district court of Salt Lake 
County. The court may also declare the 
rule in\ alid for a substantial failure to com-
ply with the provisions of the act relating 
to the procedure for ascertaining the classi-
fication of the new drug. 
The photal question in this case is, there-
fore, whether the power of the attorney 
general to add drugs to the controlled sub-
stances schedule is a grant of an uncon-
fmed, \agrant power; or whether his func-
tion is merely to determine the facts upon 
which legislative policy depends and to ex-
ercise discretion in a narrow area defined 
by ascertainable standards. 
3. U C A . a s amended, 58-37-5(b)(7) 
2. U C A , as amended, 58-37-3 
692 Utah 572 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
The appropriate test to be applied in de-
termining this question was articulated in 
the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in 
Revne v. Trade Commission:4 
To require rigid and minutely defined 
standards or guides where the matters to 
be regulated are of such a nature as to 
require flexibility, might prevent needed 
remedies. Otherwise, the legislature 
would be required to anticipate all possi-
ble situations which might arise and itself 
supply a rule or guide to fit each such 
situation, a requirement which might be 
palpably impossible. 
Roughly, the measure of the detail con-
tent of standards or guides is what the 
matter or subject to be regulated will 
practically admit of. Otherwise, the leg-
islature could not exercise its power to 
regulate what might acutely need regula-
tion because the diversity and complexity 
of the regulative problems involved, 
would not practically admit the setting of 
sufficiently detailed standards. 
This standard was applied by this Court 
in Clayton v. Bennett} In that case, plain-
tiff attacked the constitutionality of a stat-
ute relating to the licensing of architects 
because, inter alia, it was an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative authority. In uphold-
ing the statute, this Court noted: 
. . certain basic qualifications 
relating to education, age, moral charac-
ter and the requirement of satisfactorily 
passing an examination are set forth in 
the statutes. It seems obvious that the 
legislature could go no further than to set 
up such general standards. 
To resolve the question of the constitu-
tionality of the statute in this case, all that 
remains is to determine if the attorney gen-
eral^ power to add drugs to the controlled 
list is subject to those rules and guides that 
the legislature could be reasonably expected 
to provide. 
It seems to me that there is no merit to 
the contention that there exists in the law 
any denial of equal protection or of any 
unconstitutional delegation of authority. 
I would reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand the case for trial on the 
merits. 
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DIRECT IMPORT BUYER'S ASSOCIA-
TION, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
K. S. L., INC., Defendant and 
Respondent 
No. 14908. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 22, 1977. 
Suit was brought against television sta-
tion for alleged falsehoods broadcast where-
by product sold by plaintiff was stated to 
be> less efficient as a gasoline saver than 
plaintiff claimed it to be. Following rever-
sal of summary judgment for defendant, 
538 P.2d 1040, the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., directed a 
verdict for defendant at the conclusion of 
the evidence, and plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., held that: (1) 
in case of alleged defamation of a product 
of a business, special damages must be al-
leged and proved, plaintiff must prove that 
the product is not as represented by defend-
ant but is in fact as plaintiff claims it to be, 
and actual malice must be shown; (2) news-
caster cannot be held liable for accurately 
reporting erroneous information when he 
believes the source to be reliable and truth-
ful; (3) in the instant case, in which there 
were no false statements made, aside from 
repeating erroneous sales figures given re-
porter by plaintiff's product manager, and 
in which the effect of the statements was 
simply that claims made about plaintiffs 
4. 113 Utah 155, 186, 192 P.2d 563, 579 (1948) 5. 5 Utah 2d 152, 156, 298 P 2d 531, 534 (1956). 
